I've taken to spending some time each morning answering questions on Quora as a writing and brain warm-up. Over time, it has become apparent that certain philosophical questions are asked over and over. The existing answers don't seem to register with the people who ask the questions, nor do the answers change how often the question is asked.
Many of these repetitive questions involve legacy abstract concepts, like consciousness, reality, truth, and free will.
We've been discussing these issues for centuries without any resolution. As a rule of thumb, we may say that if an issue is unresolved after a century of effort to understand it, we are likely framing the problem incorrectly. If that same issue is unresolved after a millennium, then something is fundamentally wrong with philosophy.
In this and some subsequent essays, I'm going to explore how, and perhaps why, these legacy metaphysical concepts are so poorly understood and unhelpful.
I will begin, in this post, with some general comments about abstractions. My approach to this is broadly speaking nominalist. The Wikipedia article defines nominalism as "the view that universals and abstract objects do not actually exist other than being merely names or labels."
I'm extremely doubtful about this metaphysical nominalism. My argument is not about the existence or non-existence of "abstract objects". I see the problem as epistemic. There is a difference in what we can know about objects and ideas. We approach them via different sensory modalities. For example, I can physically touch an object, but I cannot touch an idea (especially someone else's ideas).
The basic argument is that abstractions are ideas rather than objects. In my mind, this means that metaphysical concepts like existent/non-existent, which are so relevant to objects, are not very relevant here. I'll get into my serious doubts about the whole project of metaphysics in the next essay.
Let's now unpack the basic argument and see where it takes us.
What is an abstraction?
We can say, first, what an abstraction is not. An abstraction is not a thing. In other words, abstractions are not objects or entities. Abstractions are not objective. Abstractions have no location, extension, or orientation in space or time. They have no causal potential. One cannot observe an abstraction in nature or observe what someone else is thinking. We can see why a nominalist with an interest in metaphysics might conclude that abstractions are "not real", but in my view, this is a category error: the descriptor "real" doesn't apply to ideas because they are ontologically subjective.
So what is an abstraction? Fundamentally, an abstraction is an idea about things. Ideas are subjective. Some people are attracted to the idea that because abstractions are subjective, they are illusions. I find this incredibly unhelpful.
More specifically, an abstraction is an idea about properties that various things are perceived to share (e.g. the greenness of plants). While "greenness" as an idea is comprehensible, it's not the kind of quality that can be observed separately from concrete examples of green objects. "Green" isn't something in its own right. Moreover, what we perceive as "green" is affected by external factors such as the frequency range of ambient light and the colour of adjacent objects. Many well-known illusions leverage such facts.
Abstractions are usually ideas about objects in the aggregate or collectively, and often take the form of generalisations. Categories and taxonomies are abstractions. And, for example, since basic colour terms are categories, colours are also abstractions. Similarly, quantities and numbers are abstract.
Abstract concepts are useful precisely because they allow us to ignore certain details and generalise about experience. And this allows us to develop heuristics (or "rules of thumb") to deal more efficiently with repetitive situations.
There are two basic mistakes we (all) make when dealing with abstractions:
- Hypostatization: treating an abstraction as independent.
- Reification: treating an abstraction as an entity, especially a physical entity.
What we need to keep clear is that abstractions are ideas about things. As such, they are not independent either of objects or of minds. So it is always a mistake to treat an abstraction as standing alone. Abstractions are derived from experience.
Notably, an abstraction cannot ever be "fundamental" precisely because it's an idea about something, and that something is always more fundamental than ideas about it. So, for example, "consciousness" cannot be a substance or a fundamental aspect of the universe, because consciousness is an abstraction based on the experience of conscious states. A conscious state is more fundamental than consciousness.
The hypostatisation and reification of abstractions is ubiquitous on Quora and beyond. I see them everywhere. I see them every day.
I've discussed George Lakoff and Mark Johnson's approach to metaphor many times (as always, phrases in small caps are metaphors). They make the point that abstract thought is generally metaphorical.
In using metaphor with abstractions, we map an abstract concept onto a concrete domain. For example, a common metaphor is: IDEAS ARE OBJECTS. This allows us to linguistically treat an abstract idea as if it were an object. And this then allows us to discuss the idea using adjectives and verbs drawn from the target domain. For example:
- Shelve that concept.
- Polish this proposal.
- Grasp the theory.
- Unpack that idea.
- A multifaceted argument.
One cannot literally or concretely shelve a concept. But the metaphor works, and no one needs to have it explained. We intuitively know that a concept is not an object that sits on a physical shelf.
This is completely normal and seldom leads to confusion in daily life.
Problems arise when we forget or overlook that the "object" is abstract and the language metaphorical. Discussions of metaphysics often seem mired in such problems.
For example, some people treat consciousness as a metaphorical agent and some as a causal agent. Agents are objects that are capable of behaviour beyond that which is dictated by ambient conditions and physical laws. Water has no agency; it always runs downhill. Agents can choose to spend energy to go uphill.
Abstract consciousness cannot, by definition, be an agent since it is an idea. We may act on our ideas, but the ideas themselves are not causal agents. I'll go into more detail on this topic in the next instalment.
Now, I think philosophers are likely aware of this kind of distinction and work with it intelligently. But the general public is not generally aware of such distinctions. While we often talk about game-changing philosophers as though they changed all of society, the coverage is actually limited to intellectuals. The fact is that most people never read philosophy, and the knowledge that reaches the common people is often partial, fragmented, and garbled.~~Φ~~
