Notes on T255

Taishō text No. 255 is a version of the extended Heart Sutra. It is not found in the ancient catalogues. The Taishō editors noted: Dùnhuáng shí shì běn 燉煌石室本 i.e. "based on a manuscript from Dunhuang" meaning it was unknown before the 20th century. T 255 is attributed by Taishō to Fǎchéng 法成, in 856 CE. In turn Fǎchéng has been identified with the Tibetan translator Chos grub (pronounced like Chodrup; fl. early 9th century).

In perusing the literature of the Heart Sutra, one often encounters the assertion that T255 was translated from Tibetan. This claim is usually unattributed, however I recently noticed that Channa Li (2021: 13, n.19) attributes the claim to the Japanese scholar Ueyama Daishun 上山大峻 (1934 - 2022). Li references Ueyama (1968, 1990) and notes that two texts, including T255, "were presumed by Ueyama to be possibly translated from Tibetan, which should be verified by more concrete studies." Li (2024: 24) adds:

Ueyama claims that this version may have been translated from the Tibetan version of the longer version of the Prajñāpāramitāhṛdaya [Heart Sūtra]. However, he does not elaborate on the concrete evidence.

Li ultimately leaves the question open, but notes (2024: 25):

One piece of supporting evidence lies in Chödrup’s translation of the term mingliao (明了, literally meaning ‘illumination’), which was more likely translated directly from the Tibetan term snang ba (‘illumination,’appearance’) than from Sanskrit avabhāsa (‘appearance’).

What follows are my edited notes of my attempt at a more concrete study. Since this post is long, I should warn readers up front that, in the end, there is only one example of such a difference, and it is countered by one which seems to point to a Sanskrit original. But neither is entirely unequivocal. So the end result of this study is no result. I cannot see anything in T255 that forces me to conclude it was translated from Tibetan. It's entirely possible that someone with a better eye and more language skills will find an example, however (a) no one else seems interested in carrying out these kinds of detailed studies, so don't hold your breath, and (b) if there is an example, it's likely to be a very subtle thing and, thus, ambiguous. If you are only interested in the conclusion, you can stop now. If you are interested in the process, please read on.

At the outset we need some idea of how we could tell if a Chinese text was translated from Tibetan or Sanskrit. How could tell, for example, if an expression such as 明了 is better attributed to a Tibetan or Sanskrit source. My basic method is to do a close reading of the four texts outlined below, looking for two things:

1. An expression found in T255, but not found in T253.
2. A lexical or grammatical mismatch between the Sanskrit and Tibetan texts that explains the difference between T255 and T253.

SOURCES

I will mainly compare four texts:

• T 253, as representative of the Chinese extended text.*
• T 255.
• The canonical Tibetan extended Heart Sutra, especially as reflected in Silk's (1994) Recension A (hereafter TibA).
• The extended Prajñāpāramitāhṛdaya in Conze's edition (taking into account my published corrections: Attwood 2024).

* T252 is also extended, but has added a very different introduction and conclusion. T254 is merely a lightly edited version of T253. T257 was only translated ca 1000 CE.

For convenience, I will use Silk's divisions of the text into paragraphs, focussing on paragraphs D-W, i.e. ignoring the preliminaries, the title, and any colophons, and focusing only on the text of the Heart Sutra per se. I parsed the Tibetan with help from the Tibetan and Himalayan Library translation tool in conjunction with Silk's (1994) texts and translations.

Li notes that T255 is more like Silk's TibA, however we cannot assume that Chos grub had the canonical Tibetan text to hand, if indeed he did translate from Tibetan.

Something to keep in mind is that all the extended Heart Sutra texts, including the odd ones like T252, largely reproduce the standard text where possible (with only minor variations). In other words, the middle part of the extended text follows the standard text in Chinese, Sanskrit, and Tibetan. I'm not sure that this amounts to anything more than being a curious fact.

So now let's dive into a close reading, noting variants. I use colour coding for comparative purposes. I haven't been very consistent in doing this.

COMPARISON

Paragraph D

• 253: 如是我聞：一時佛 在王舍城 耆闍崛山中，與大比丘眾及菩薩眾俱。時佛世尊即入三昧，名廣大甚深。
• 255: 如是我聞：一時薄伽梵住王舍城鷲峯山中，與大苾蒭眾及諸菩薩摩訶薩俱。爾時，世尊等入甚深明了三摩地法之異門。
• TibA. 'di skad bdag gis thos pa dus gcig na / bcom ldan 'das rgyal po'i khab bya rgod phung po'i ri la dge slong gi dge 'dun chen po dang / byang chub sems dpa'i dge 'dun chen po dang thabs gcig tu bzhugs te / de'i tshe bcom ldan 'das zab mo snang ba zhes bya ba chos kyi rnam grangs kyi ting nge 'dzin la snyoms par zhugs so //
• Skt. evaṃ mayā śrutam | ekasmin samaye bhagavān rājagṛhe viharati sma gṛdhrakūṭe parvate mahatā bhikṣusaṃghena sārdhaṃ mahatā ca bodhisattvasaṃghena | tena khalu samayena bhagavān gambhīrāvabhāsaṃ nāma dharmaparyāyaṃ bhāṣitvā samādhiṃ samāpannaḥ.
• Thus have I heard. One time the Bhagavan was dwelling on Vulture's Peak in Rājagṛha, together with a large assembly of bhikṣu-s and a large assembly of bodhisatvas. At that time, the Bhagavan entered a samādhi named "appearance of the profound".

Notes:

• T253 fó 佛 "Buddha" versus T255 bógāfàn 薄伽梵 “Bhagavān”
• zài 在 "at" vs zhù 住 "residing" (= viharati sma). Very similar characters, easily mistaken.
• Different spellings of Gṛdhakūṭa 耆闍崛山 vs 鷲峯山
• T253 sānmèi 三昧; T255 sānmódì 三摩地 = Skt samādhi. Tib ting nge 'dzin.
• T255 adds 明了 “clear” = snang ba and 法之異門 “distinct mode”

Both T253 and T255 refer to a great assembly 大 ... 眾 (mahatā ... -saṇghena) of bhikṣu-s 比丘, but drop "great" for the assembly of bodhisatvas. T253 has plain "bodhisatva-assembly" 菩薩眾, but T255 has bodhisatva-mahāsatva. Neither Tibetan nor Sanskrit have mahāsatva here though both have it elsewhere in the text. Conze notes no variants with mahāsatva here and I'm not aware of any.

Silk (1994: 172) "...the Blessed One was entered into the concentration of the Preaching of the Dharma called "profound illumination". However, on gambhīra-avabhāsa, compare Han (2020: 398):

In the same way, as many as there are the appearance of thoughts, the appearance of forms (rūpāvabhāsa), or the appearance of sounds (śabdāvabhāsa), all those reflect in a single appearance of the bodhisatva who maintains the ocean-seal samādhi, thus it is called the ocean-seal samādhi.

Also note the following Pāli passage from the Mahānidāna Sutta (DN 15)

Gambhīro cāyaṃ, ānanda, paṭiccasamuppādo gambhīrāvabhāso ca. (DN II 55)

Ānanda, this dependent arising is profound and appears profound.

Also:

Siyā nu kho, bhante, esevattho vitthārena vuccamāno gambhīro ceva assa gambhīrāvabhāso cā’’ti? (SN 12.24)

Gambhīro cāyaṁ, ānanda, paṭiccasamuppādo gambhīrāvabhāso ca. (SN 12.60)

Note that in Aṣṭa no bodhisatvas are identified as being present. Also bodhisatvas are discussed in the abstract, no one is ever directly addressed as, or referred to as being, "a bodhisatva".

明了

Since Li (2024) identified 明了 as a possible indicator of Chodrup having a Tibetan source text lets examine this closely, beginning by parsing each version of the passage separately so we can compare them.

253: 時 / 佛世尊 / 即 / 入 / 三昧 / 名/ 廣大甚深。
At that time / tathāgata / then / entered / a samādhi / named / vast and very profound

Where 廣大甚深 is 廣大 "broad vast" and 甚 "very" 深 "deep"

255: 爾時 / 世尊 / 等入 / 甚深 / 明了 / 三摩地 / 法之異門。
At that time / bhagavan / fully entered / a very deep / lucid / samādhi / dharma teaching.

TibA: de'i tshe / bcom ldan 'das / zab mo snang ba / zhes bya ba / chos kyi rnam grangs / kyi / ting nge 'dzin / la / snyoms par zhugs so.
At that time / Bhagavan / Profound Illumination / named / dharmaparyāya / (of) / samādhi / (into) / entered

Note that in TibB, the phrase chos kyi rnam grangs is transposed into the phrase zab mo snang ba giving zab mo chos kyi rnam grangs snang ba, substantially changing the meaning of this passage. Although Silk does not discuss this problem, see the different translations (Silk 1994: 172-173)

Skt: tena khalu samayena bhagavān gambhīrāvabhāsaṃ nāma dharmaparyāyaṃ bhāṣitvā samādhiṃ samāpannaḥ.
At that time / the Bhagavan / profound appearance / named / dharma teaching / having spoken / samādhi / entered.

So the terms we are discussing are

• Chinese: shèn shēn míng liǎo 甚深明了 "very deep and lucid"
• Sanskrit: gambhīrāvabhāsa "profound appearance"
• Tibetan: zab mo snang ba = gambhīra-avabhāsa

(Note: Hopkins Dictionary s.v. snang ba "appear; perceive; light; illuminate; appearance; illumination")

As far as I can see 明了 in T255 suggests someone has misread avabhāsa due to the etymological fallacy. Semantically, the root is √bhā "shine" but pragmatically, the prefix ava- changes the sense to "appear". Compare this with lokayati "look" and avalokayati "examine" (not, as Conze mistakenly asserts, "looks down"). The standardised Tibetan translation of avabhāsa is snang ba. The ambiguity between the semantic "shine" and pragmatic "appear" senses occurs in both Sanskrit and Tibetan. So this does not seem to be diagnostic as Li (2024) suggested. As far as I can see.

Paragraph E

This para mirrors the standard text, in the sense that it shows Guanyin in his characteristic role (in this context), i.e. observing the skandhas.

• T253: 爾時眾中有菩薩摩訶薩，名觀自在，行深般若波羅蜜多時，照見五蘊皆空，離諸苦厄。
• T255: 復於爾時，觀自在菩薩摩訶薩行深般若波羅蜜多時，觀察照見五蘊體性悉皆是空。
• Skt: tena ca samayena āryāvalokiteśvaro bodhisattvo mahāsattvo gambhīrāyāṃ prajñāpāramitāyāṃ caryāṃ caramāṇaḥ evaṃ vyavalokayati sma pañca skandhāṃs tāṃś ca svabhāvaśūnyaṃ vyavalokayati.
• TibA: yang de'i tshe byang chub sems dpa' sems dpa' chen po 'phags pa spyan ras gzigs dbang phyug shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa zab mo spyod pa nyid la rnam par blta zhing / phung po lnga po de dag la yang rang bzhin gyis stong par rnam par blta'o //

Here Guanyin is practising the practice of profound perfection of prajñā. He observes (vyavalokayati sma) the five skandhas. However, the text goes awry after this, at least in Sanskrit and Tibetan.

In English, Sanskrit, and Tibetan we divide visual actions into looking and seeing, which are analogous to seeking and finding. In the standard Sanskrit text, the two verbs are both in the periphrastic past (a third person singular present indicative verb with the periphrastic particle sma): vayavalokayati sma "he observed" and paśyati sma "he saw". These are derived from the roots vyava√lok and √paś respectively. In Tibetan, we might expect to contrast blta "looking" with mthong "seeing". The latter occurs for example, in TibB, para I.

In the Sanskrit and Tibetan texts, where we expect the second verb to mean "seeing", we find a repetition of vyavalokayati "observing" but without sma and thus in the present tense. So instead of "he observed" and "he saw", we have "he observed" (past) and "he observes, he is observing" (present tense).

This is a previously unnoticed grammatical error called a constructional mismatch. What we expect, per the standard text is a combination of vyava√lok and √paś in the same person, number, tense, mood, etc.

However, since the error occurs in both Sanskrit and Tibetan, this uncorrected error is not diagnostic for our purposes. Moreover, we cannot tell whether the mistake occurred in composition or copying. However since it occurs in both Sanskrit and Tibetan, we can infer that the canonical Tibetan text was translated from an already defective Sanskrit text.

Paragraphs F and H

In Para F, TibB spells Śāriputra as shā ra dwā ti'i bu, i.e. Śāradvātiputra. This spelling is also found in TibA in para H.

This spelling is not reflected anywhere in T255, or any other Chinese Heart Sutra text.

Paragraph I

This paragraph is the end of the extended introduction. As with Para E, something goes wrong here.

In T251 the sentence has four clauses: (1) Guanyin practiced (行) Prajñāpāramitā; (2) he observed (照見) the five skandhas, and (3) [saw] they are absent; (4) and [as a result] he transcended (度) suffering. The verb for "see" is omitted (and generally no one notices this). The Sanskrit standard text only has three clauses, with (4) being omitted in all known witnesses; with the three verbs being (1) caramāṇo*, (2) vyavalokayati sma, and (3) paśyati sma.

* Actually a present participle, used to indicate an action simultaneous with the main verb.

In T251, Guanyin is the agent of all four verbs. In the extended texts, the agent has become the kulaputra/kuladuhitṛ (hereafter kula°), but there is another constructional mismatch.

Compare:

• T253: 「舍利子！若善男子、善女人行甚深般若波羅蜜多行時，應觀五蘊性空。
• T254: 「若善男子及善女人，欲修行甚深般若波羅蜜多者，彼應如是觀察，五蘊體性皆空。
• Skt: yaḥ kaścic chāriputra kulaputro va kuladuhitā vā asyāṃ gambhīrāyāṃ prajñāpāramitāyāṃ caryāṃ cartukāmas tenaivaṃ vyavalokitavyam pañca skandhāṃs tāṃś ca svabhāvaśūnyān paśyati sma.
• TibA: shā ri'i bu rigs kyi bu 'am rigs kyi bu mo gang la la shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa zab mo spyod pa spyad par 'dod pa des 'di ltar rnam par blta bar bya ste / phung po lnga po de dag kyang rang bzhin gyis stong par rnam par yang dag par rjes su blta'o //
• TibB (2): ... / phung po lnga po de dag ngo bo nyid kyis stong par yang dag par rjes su mthong ba de ltar blta bar bya ste//

In Paragraph G, Śāriputra asks the question, How should a kula° practice (kathaṃ śikṣitavyaṃ)? Since the verbal form here is a future passive participle (or gerundive), we expect the answer to be in the same mode, i.e. "The kulaputra should [do something]."

Para I begins the reply as expected using the same verbal mode, i.e. vyavalokitavya "[the kula°] should observe" , in the same future passive mode. And what they should observe is the five skandhas (a classic Buddhist meditation practice). Having stated this, we have a complete and comprehensible sentence.

However, in Para I, all the extended texts now add some variation on "and he sees them [i.e. the skandhas] as lacking svabhāva".

However, the counterpart "see", uses the periphrastic past paśyati sma "[the kulaputra] saw", when we expect a future tense verb here: i.e. "The kula° should observe the skandhas and they [will see something]." The shift in tense is a constructional mismatch.

While the look/see structure must be explicit in Sanskrit and English (and Tibetan?), it may be implied in Chinese. Hence, in the Chinese versions, we see verbs meaning "look, observe, etc" (i.e. yīngguān* 應觀, guān 觀) but no verb meaning "see". For comparison, T251 has zhàojiàn 照見 "observe, inspect".

* note that yīng 應 is also transcribed yìng in Buddhist contexts, cf. DDB s.v. 應

What Guanyin sees when he looks at the five skandhas (zhàojiàn wǔ yùn 照見五蘊) in T251 is jiē kōng 皆空, literally "all empty" or "everything is absent" (Note: T250 omits jiē 皆). We might not have noticed this without the Sanskrit translations, which have to specify both look and see.

My interpretation of this is that we are describing a samādhi in which dharmas have stopped arising and thus the branches of experience (skandhāḥ) are absent (śūnya). Where absent is an epistemic term meaning "cannot be perceived" or "is not found" and not, as usually assumed, a metaphysical term meaning "does not exist". Treating this an epistemic denial is far less paradoxical and far more interesting.

In the standard text (T251, 250) Guanyin is the agent of both looking and seeing.

Note that where T251 asserts that the skandhas are 皆空, the Sanskrit standard text and all the extended texts append some reference to svabhāva, i.e. T253 性空 "absent-natured" (omitting 皆) and T255 體性皆空. "intrinsic natures are all absent".

Tibetan: rang bzhin gyis "intrinsically" stong par "empty" = Skt svabhāvaśūnyān

I can find no diagnostic differences between Sanskrit and Tibetan in this paragraph.

Paragraph J

This is the famous passage usually translated "form is emptiness..." etc. Silk translates the Tibetan as "Matter is empty", which seems to be an uncharacteristic blunder.

My approach to Prajñāpāramitā sets aside the usual metaphysical overlay. Following the way that Sue Hamilton approached the Pāli suttas, I read the Heart Sutra as concerned with experience rather than reality. That is to say, without any implied reference to Husserl, that the Heart Sutra is making phenomenological points rather than metaphysical points. We can call this the Hamiltonian hermeneutic.

Similarly, the negations that follow (na rūpa etc) reflect the absence of sensory experience following the "cessation of recognition and experience" (saṃjñāvedayitanirodha), which is brought about by yǐwúsuǒdégù 以無所得故. Huifeng (2014) showed that Kumārajīva coined this term to translate anupalambhayogena "by means of the practice of nonapprehension", which refers to withdrawing attention from sense experience using meditative (or, better, self-hypnotic) techniques.

When no sense experience arises, due to nonapprehension one cannot apply ontologies of sense experience such as skandha, dhātu, or āyatana to the resulting absence. An ontology of absence would be an oxymoron.

As I have repeatedly said in my writing: rūpa is to the eye as sound is to the ear. This fundamental observation has to be kept in mind because it tells us that the one thing that rūpa-skandha absolutely cannot be is "matter".

Here, we encounter for the first time a difference that might be diagnostic. The highlighted term occurs in Tibetan but not Sanskrit, and in T255 but not T253.

• T253: 舍利子！色不異空，空不異色。色即是空，空即是色。受、想、行、識亦復如是。
• T255: 色即是空，空即是色。色不異空，空不異色。如是受、想、行、識亦復皆空。
• Skt: rūpaṃ śūnyatā, śūnyataiva rūpam; rūpān na pṛthak śūnyatā, śūnyatāyā na pṛthag rūpam. Evaṃ vedanā-saṃjñā-saṃskāra-vijñānaṃ.
• TibA: gzugs stong pa’o // stong pa nyid kyang gzugs so // gzugs las stong pa nyid gzhan ma yin no // stong pa nyid las kyang gzugs gzhan ma yin no // de bzhin du tshor ba dang / ‘du shes dang / ‘du byed dang / rnam par shes pa rnams stong pa’o //

Having compared rūpa and śūnyatā, T251 summarises for the other skandhas: 受想行識亦復如是, i.e. "Vedanā, saṃjñā, saṃskāra, and vijñāna are the same as this". And T253 follows T251. All of these Chinese texts are consistent with the Sanskrit: evaṃ vedanā-saṃjñā-saṃskāra-vijñānaṃ.

However, T255 phrases this differently:

如是受、想、行、識亦復皆空。i.e. "Similarly, vedanā, saṃjñā, saṃskāra, [and] vijñāna [are] likewise all insubstantial".

The redundant "likewise" is for emphasis. The Tibetan reads:

de bzhin du tshor ba dang / ‘du shes dang / ‘du byed dang / rnam par shes pa rnams stong pa’o //
Likewise, vedanā and saṃjñā and samskāra and vijñāna [are] empty.

The phrase rnams stong pa corresponds to jiē kōng 皆空. There is no expression in the Sanskrit text that corresponds to this. This suggests that the translator may have been working from a Tibetan source similar to TibA (and not similar to TibB which has a major transposition error in this passage).

Paragraph K

There are no significant differences between Sanskrit and Tibetan in this paragraph.

In K, where T253 has zhū fǎ kōng xiàng 諸法空相 "all phenomena are marked with absence". T255 has the synonymous expression yī qiè fǎ kōng xìng 一切法空性. 諸 and 一切 both effectively mean "all". 相 is perhaps the most common translation of lakṣana "characteristic"; while 性 means "nature" (it's used about to translate svabhāva in Para I).

Paragraph L.

Here there is a different in the opening clause:

• 253: 是故空中無色...
• 255: 舍利子！是故爾時空性之中，無色...
• Skt: Tasmāt tarhi śāriputra śūnyatāyāṃ na rūpam...
• TibA: shā ri'i bu de lta bas na stong pa nyid la gzugs med /

T253 does not include the name Śāriputra, T255 does. However, both Skt and TibA include the name.

T253 has 是故 "therefore". T255 has 是故 爾時 "therefore, at that time". However, in this case, T255 follows the Sanskrit and not the Tibetan.

• Skt. Therefore (tasmāt) at that that time (tarhi), in absence (śūnyatāyām) no appearance (na rūpaṃ)
• TibA: de lta bas na (therefore) stong pa nyid la (in absence) gzugs med (no form).

Paragraphs M, N, O

No significant differences.

Paragraph P

• T253: 以無所得故，菩提薩埵依般若波羅蜜多故心無罣礙。無罣礙故，無有恐怖，遠離顛倒夢想，究竟涅槃。
• T255: 是故舍利子！以無所得故，諸菩薩眾依止般若波羅蜜多，心無障礙，無有恐怖，超過顛倒，究竟涅槃
• Tasmāc Chāriputra aprāptitvena bodhisattvānāṃ prajñāpāramitāmāśritya viharati cittāvaraṇaḥ| cittāvaraṇanāstitvādatrasto viparyāsātikrānto niṣṭhanirvāṇaḥ|
• shā ri'i bu de lta bas na byang chub sems dpa' rnams thob pa med pa'i phyir / shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa la brten cing gnas te / sems la sgrib pa med pas skrag pa med de / phyin ci log las shin tu 'das nas mya ngan las 'das pa'i mthar phyin to //

T253 opens with 以無所得故 which Huifeng (2014) identified as Kumārajīva's unique translation of (tacca) anupalambhayogena "(and that) by means of practising non-apprehension", coined for the purpose of translating the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā (Pañc). The term recurs throughout Pañc and T223. As such, we have to see aprāptitvāt as a mistranslation of 以無所得故, based on confusion between 得 (pra√āp) and 所得 (upa√labh), fostered by the previous phrase 無得 "no attainment" (Skt na prāptiḥ). Huifeng also showed that, in Pañc, the final negation is given as "no attainment and no realisation" na prāpti nābhisamayaṃ (followed by examples of each that are omitted from the Heart Sutra). And as such Kumārajīva either mistranslated or had a defective manuscript.

Huifeng noted this term ought to go at the end of Para O, since it qualifies all the negations from L-O. And I confirmed that the term almost always occurs in the sentence or paragraph final position, where it qualified what comes before.

And keep in mind that for this para there is a serious mismatch between Chinese and Sanskrit, with the Sanskrit translation being particularly garbled at this point. This makes comparison difficult if not impossible.

The main difference occurs here:

• T253 心無罣礙, where 罣礙 means “being caught, entangled, impeded from within.”
• T255 心無障礙, where 障礙 means “being blocked, obstructed more generally.” This phrase may be influenced by the Sanskrit term citta-āvaraṇa, which Huifeng (2014) noted is a mistranslation of 心無罣礙. While no exact Sanskrit counter part exists, we can show indirectly that it likely corresponds to na kvacit sajjati "not stuck on anything".

However, there is no corresponding difference in Skt or TibA, since cittāvaraṇaḥ = sems la sgrib pa

Paragraphs R, S, T

No significant differences.

Paragraph U

• T253: 如是說已。即時，世尊從廣大甚深三摩地起，讚觀自在菩薩摩訶薩言：「善哉，善哉！善男子！如是，如是！如汝所說。
• T255: 爾時，世尊從彼定起，告聖者觀自在菩薩摩訶薩曰：「善哉，善哉！善男子！如是，如是！如汝所說。
• Skt: atha khalu bhagavān tasmāt samādher vyutthāya āryāvalokiteśvarasya bodhisattvasya mahāsattvasya sādhukāram adāt. sādhu sādhu kulaputra | evam etat kulaputra, evam etad.
• TibA: de nas bcom ldan 'das ting nge 'dzin de las bzhengs te / byang chub sems dpa' sems dpa' chen po 'phags pa spyan ras gzigs dbang phyug la legs so zhes bya ba byin nas / legs so legs so // rigs kyi bu de de bzhin no //

There is a minor difference between T253 and T255 in the first clause. Both use the construction: 從 "from" …. 起 "arose". T253 repeats the name of the samādhi and uses the same transcription, i.e. 三摩地. However, T255 abbreviates this to 從彼定起 "... arose from that samādhi, this time translating samādhi 定 rather than using the transcription in Para D above.

However, there is no corresponding difference between Skt samādher vyutthāya and Tibetan ting nge 'dzin de las bzhengs te, which both mean "arose from samādhi"

Paragraph V

• T 253: 甚深般若波羅蜜多行，應如是行。如是行時，一切如來皆悉隨喜。
• T 255: 彼當如是修學般若波羅蜜多。一切如來亦當隨喜。
• Skt: gambhīrāyāṃ prajñāpāramitāyāṃ caryāṃ cartavyaṃ yathā tvayā nirdiṣṭam anumodyate sarva-tathāgatair arhadbhiḥ.
• TibA: rigs kyi bu de de bzhin te / ji ltar khyod kyis bstan pa de bzhin du shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa zab mo la spyad par bya ste / de bzhin gshegs pa rnams kyang rjes su yi rang ngo //

rigs kyi bu / de de bzhin te /
kulaputra / in the same way

ji ltar / khyod kyis / bstan pa / de bzhin du / shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa / zab mo la / spyad par bya ste /
just as / by you / was taught / likewise / Prajñāpāramitā / profound / should engage in

de bzhin gshegs pa rnams / kyang rjes su yi rang ngo //
Tathagatas (all) / rejoice //

For reasons that are not clear to me, Silk (1994: 184-185) translates de bzhin gshegs pa as "the Sugatas", rather than the more conventional tathāgata (per the THL translation tool).

The two Chinese texts are obviously quite different here. Apart from the fact that T255 omits the middle two clauses, present in both Skt and Tibetan, the sentence construction is different.

T253: "The practice of the profound Prajñāpāramitā should be practiced this way. When practising this way, all (一切) the tathāgatas entirely (皆悉) rejoice.

T225: Prajñāpāramitā should be (當) cultivated and practiced (修學) in this way (如是) by him (彼).

Neither Chinese text has a parallel to "just as you have taught it" (yathā tvayā nirdiṣṭam) or "worthy" (arhadbhiḥ).

However, the differences here are not diagnostic, since Skt and TibA are more or less same, except that TibA has no parallel arhadbhiḥ either. Arguments from absence are weak. In this case, an omission might occur for any number of reasons, including scribal error.

Paragraph W.

• T253: 爾時世尊說是語已，具壽舍利弗大喜充遍，觀自在菩薩摩訶薩亦大歡喜。時彼眾會天、人、阿修羅、乾闥婆等，聞佛所說，皆大歡喜，信受奉行。
• T255: 時薄伽梵說是語已。具壽舍利子， 聖者觀自在菩薩摩訶薩，一切世間天、人、阿蘇羅、乾闥婆等，聞佛所說，皆大歡喜，信受奉行。
• Skt: Idam avocad bhagavān. āttamanā āyuṣmānc chāriputraḥ āryāvalokiteśvaro bodhisattvo mahāsatvo sā ca sarvāvatī pariṣat sadeva-mānuṣāsura-gandharvaś ca loko bhagavato bhāṣitam abhyanandann iti.
• TibA: bcom ldan 'das kyis de skad ces bka' stsal nas / tshe dang ldan pa shā ri'i bu dang / byang chub sems dpa' sems dpa' chen po 'phags pa spyan ras gzigs dbang phyug dang / thams cad dang ldan pa'i 'khor de dag dang / lha dang / mi dang / lha ma yin dang / dri zar bcas pa'i 'jig rten yi rangs te / bcom ldan 'das kyis gsungs pa la mngon par bstod do //

Note that here the punctuation added to the Chinese by CBETA is inconsistent. And there is a slight difference in the construction, with T253 has Guanyin and Śāriputra rejoicing individually, before everyone else, while T255 has everyone rejoicing at the same time.

Otherwise, there are no significant differences.

Conclusion

Given that every manuscript copy of the Heart Sutra is different, when we compare any two versions of the text, we expect to find differences. Moreover, we also expect different translators to use different expressions for the same passage. And indeed, there are many such differences between T253 and T255.

The goal was to identify distinctive features of T255 that could be explained by a similar distinction in the Tibetan texts, and absent from Sanskrit. To achieve this goal, I carefully parsed each of the four texts, one sentence at a time, looking at lexicon, syntax, and grammar.

I did note two previously unreported instances of construction mismatch, i.e. cases of sentences where the verb unexpected changes tense or mood. These occur in Para's E and I. This is further evidence that the extended text was also a Chinese production. I've already noted that the extended text exists in two distinct recensions: T252 and the rest. Ben Nourse's unpublished conference presentation makes it seem likely to me that the extended texts were composed in or around Dunhuang.

I found only one example of a significant difference in which T255 followed Tibetan rather than Sanskrit. In Paragraph J, T253 and the Sanskrit text both follow T251 in concluding the discussion of appearance and absence by noting that the other skandhas are the same.

• T251: 受想行識亦復如是
• Sanskrit: evaṃ vedanā-saṃjñā-saṃskāra-vijñānaṃ.

T255 alone adds "and likewise all are absent" 亦復皆空

The Tibetan, in both TibA and TibB (Silk 1994: 120-121) also adds a similar qualification:

de bzhin du tshor ba dang / ‘du shes dang / ‘du byed dang / rnam par shes pa rnams stong pa’o //< br/> Likewise, vedanā and saṃjñā and saṃskāra and vijñāna [are] empty.

And contrarily, we find one example that appears to point the other way in Paragraph L:

• T253: 是故... "Therefore".
• T255 是故 爾時... "Therefore, at that time".
• Skt. tasmāt tarhi... "Therefore at that that time."
• TibA: de lta bas na... "Therefore..."

Unfortunately, while this exercise took many hours, there are no unequivocal examples that force us to adopt Ueyama's conclusion that Chos grub translated T255 from Tibetan. While I don't rule out someone else finding such evidence, I cannot find any. This result doesn't disprove the assertion by Ueyama. What it does is call into doubt the rationale for making the assertion in the first place. There seems to be no reason to believe that Chos grub was working from Tibetan, and thus no reason to assert this as a possibility.

~~Φ~~

Bibliography

Attwood Jayarava (2024). "Revised Editions of the Prajñāpāramitāhṛdaya and Bānrěbōluómìduō xīn jīng «般若波羅蜜多心經»." Asian Literature and Translation. 11(1). 52-92.

Han, Jaehee. 2020. The Sky as a Mahāyāna Symbol of Emptiness and Generous Fullness: A Study and Translation of the Gaganagañjaparipṛcchā. Volume 2: Edition and Translation. Dissertation for Dr Philos, University of Oslo.

Li, Channa. 2022. "Toward A Typology of Chödrup’s (Tib. Chos Grub, Chin. Facheng 法成) Cursive Handwriting: A Palaeographical Perspective." BuddhistRoad Paper 1.2. Ruhr Universität Bochum.

Li, Channa. 2024. “Toward a History of Chödrup’s (fl. First Half of 9th C., Tib. Chos grub, Chin, Facheng 法成)Monastic Activities: An Introduction and a Working Chronology.” BuddhistRoad Paper 1.3. Ruhr Universität Bochum.

Ueyama Daishūn上山大峻. 1968. “大蕃國大徳三藏法師沙門法成の研究(下). 東方學報 39: 119–222. [Daibankoku daitoku sanzōhōshi shamonhōjō no kenkyū (ge) .” [Tōhō gakuhō Studies on the Great Monk of Tufan Empire, Tripiṭakācārya, Śramaṇa ChödrupJournal of Oriental Studies, Kyoto]

Ueyama Daishūn 上山大峻. 1990. 敦煌仏教の研究 [Tonkō bukkyō no kenkyū Studies on Dunhuang Buddhism]. Kyoto: Hōzōkan, .

Xuanzang's translation stats

This analysis of Xuanzang’s translations is based on "Hsüan-tsang's Translations and Works" published on Charles Muller's website, which Dan Lusthaus extracted from his own book on Yogācāra. Unfortunately Lusthaus’ list includes come inaccuracies.

• The idea that Xuanzang translated the Xīn jīng in 649 CE is a myth from a single uncorroborated source. I can show that the Xīn jīng was composed between 26 Dec 654 and 13 Mar 656 CE).
• The Vaj translation in 648 CE is very doubtful, especially as Lusthaus lists it as T 220 (see next). The claim is also from a single uncorroborated, the Yancong biography (T 2053), which is a religious hagiography and thus an unreliable source of historical facts. 
• Lusthaus lists T220 as translated in 660 CE, but it was not completed until 663 (and is usually said to be the last text Xuanzang translated before he died).

In addition, Lusthaus included two original compositions, which I have omitted because I wish to focus on his translation outputs.

The reason I became interested in this is that Liu Shufen (2022)* argued that Xuanzang's output dropped off precipitously after Gāozōng 高宗 (r. 15 July 649 – 27 December 683) became emperor. In order to see this for myself, I have reformatted Lusthaus' list, removed his notes, converted the Romanisation to Pinyin, and adjusted it to conform with facts about the Xīn jīng and Xuanzang established by my research.

* Liu, Shufen. (2022). "The Waning Years of the Eminent Monk Xuanzang and his Deification in China and Japan." In Chinese Buddhism and the Scholarship of Erik Zürcher. Edited by Jonathan A. Silk and Stefano Zacchetti, 255–289. Leiden: Brill. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1163/9789004522152_010

Xuanzang's translation career spanned 645-664 CE (~19 years). His journey to and through India was from 629-645 (~16 years).

Xuanzang translation output totalled 73 texts spread over 1331 scrolls (juàn 卷).* This gives us an average 18 scrolls per text. However, T220 in 600 scrolls skews this considerably: it accounts for almost half the total output over 19 years. If we look at the other 72 texts they average just 10 scrolls each (on it's own T220 almost doubles the average).

* On the juàn 卷 as a unit of measure see Zuo, Ya. 2022. "Counting Books by the Juan: Material and Conceptual Aspects of the Chinese Book." Asia Major, 3d ser. Vol. 35(1): 33-73.

This is thought to be about half of the texts he brought back from India. On Xuanzang's death, Emperor Gaozong withdrew funding and support for his translation program and disbanded his assistants.

Xuanzang translated an average of ~70 scrolls per year. However, again, this figure is heavily skewed by T220. If we recalculate up to 663, leaving out T220, then the average is ~40.6 scrolls per year. But the number of scrolls per year varied considerably. See figure 1. below.

Figure 1.

Of 73 texts translated, 43 were 1 scroll. 19 were 10 or more juan. Above I noted the claim by Liu Shufen (2022) that Xuanzang's output dropped off precipitously after Gāozōng 高宗 (r. 15 July 649 – 27 December 683) became emperor. However, as far as I can this doesn't seem to be the case. He did have some lean years in 648, 652, and 654, but there doesn't seem to be a pattern. 

Figure 2.

The four largest texts were:

• T 1562 (80 scrolls) completed 653
• T 1579 (100 scrolls) completed 647
• T 1545 (200 scrolls) completed 656
• T 220 (600 scrolls) completed 663

In addition Xuanzang completed his travelogue (with the help of Bianji) and an exposition on the eight vijñānas (undated, no length specified).

• Dàtáng xīyù jì «大唐西域記» "Great T'ang Record of Western Regions" by Xuanzang 玄奘. T 2087 (12 juan).
• Bāshí guījǔ sòng «八識規矩頌» "Verses on the Structure of the Eight Consciousnesses" by Xuanzang 玄奘. (? Juan). Not included in Taishō.

Leaving aside T220, Xuanzang put a great deal more effort into śāstra texts (647 scrolls) than sutra texts (75 scrolls).

The only substantial sutra, other than Prajñāpāramitā, that Xuanzang translated was the Dà púsà zàng jīng «大菩薩藏經» (T 310) or Bodhisattvapiṭaka Sūtra, which is a part of the Ratnakūṭa Sūtra. As far as I can see, he only translated Mahāyāna sutras, including 7 dhāraṇī texts.

~~Φ~~

Appendix: List of Works (includes compositions)

Year 645 (43 juan)

1. Dà púsà zàng jīng «大菩薩藏經» "Sutra of the Scriptural-Basket of the Great Bodhisattva". Bodhisattvapiṭaka Sūtra. T 310 [sūtra 12 secs. 35-54] (20 juan).

2. Xiǎnyáng shèngjiào lùn song «顯揚聖教論頌» "Exposition of the ārya Teachings, Verse Treatise" by Asaṅga (*Prakaraṇāryavākā) T 1603 (1 juan).

3. Fódì jīng «佛地經» "Buddha-Stage Sutra" (Buddhabhūmi Sūtra). T 680 (1 juan).

4.Liùmén tuóluóní jīng «六門陀羅尼經» "Six Gates Dhāraṇī Sutra". Saṇmukhidhāranī. T 1360 (1 juan).

5.Xiǎnyáng shèngjiào lùn «顯揚聖教論» "Exposition of the Ārya Teachings" by Asaṅga. T 1602 (20 juan).

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Year 646 (38 juan)

6. Dàchéng āpídámó zájí lùn «大乘阿毗達摩雜集論» "Mahāyāna Abhidharma Mixed-Collection Treatise." Abhidharmasamuccaya Vyākhyā by Sthiramati. T 1606 (16 juan).

7. Dàtáng xīyù jì «大唐西域記» "Great T'ang Record of Western Regions" by Xuanzang 玄奘. T 2087 (12 juan).

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Year 647 (117)

8. Dàchéng wǔyùn lùn «大乘五蘊論» (1 juan) "Mahāyāna Treatise on the Five Skandhas". Paṅcaskandhaka Prakaraṇa by Vasubandhu. T 1612.

9. Shè dàchéng lùn wúxìng shì «攝大乘論無性釋» "Asvabhāva's commentary on the Mahāyānasaṅgraha" *Mahāyānasaṅgrahopani Bandhana by *Asvabhāva 無性. T 1598 (10 juan)

10. Yúqié shīdì lùn «瑜伽師地論» "Stages of Yoga Practice Treatise". Yogācārabhūmi Śāstra by Maitreya 彌勒. T 1579 (100 juan).

11. Jiě shēnmì jīng «解深密經» "Sutra Explaining the Deep Secret" Saṅdhinirmocana Sūtra. T 676 (5 juan)

12. Yin ming ju cheng-li lun «因明入正理論» "Introduction to Logic" Nyāyapraveśa by Śaṅkarasvāmin 商羯羅主. T 1630 (1 juan)

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Year 648 (15)

13. Tiān qǐng wèn jīng «天請問經» "Questioning Devas Sutra". Devatā sūtra. T 593 (1 juan)

14. Shíjù yì lùn «十句義論» "Treatise on the Ten Padārthas". Vaiśeṣika Daśapadārtha śāstra by Maticandra 慧月. T 2138 (1 juan)

15. Wéishí sānshí lùn «唯識三十論» "Thirty Verses on Vijñaptimātra Treatise" *Triṃśikā Vijñaptimātra Śāstra by Vasubandhu 世親. T 1586 (1 juan).

16. Jīngāng bānruò jīng «金剛般若經» "Diamond Sutra". Vajracchedikā Prajñāpāramitā. T 220. (1 juan) (NB T 220 translated much later see below).

17. Bǎifǎ míngmén lùn «百法明門論» "Lucid Introduction to the One Hundred Dharmas". Mahāyāna Śatadharmāprakāśamukha Śāstra by Vasubandhu 世.親T 1614 (1 juan).

18. Shè dàchéng lùn Shìqīn shì «攝大乘論世親釋» "Vasubandhu's commentary on the Mahāyānasaṅgraha". Mahāyānasaṅgrahabhāṣya by Vasubandhu (Shìqīn 世親). T 1597 (10 juan).

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Year 649 (35)

19. Shè dàchéng lùn běn «攝大乘論本» "Encyclopedia of Mahāyāna" Mahāyānasaṅgraha by Asaṅga 無著. T 1594 (3 juan).

20. Yuánqǐ shèngdào jīng «緣起聖道經» "Sutra of Ārya Teachings on Pratītya-samutpāda". Nidāna sūtra. T 714 (1 juan).

21. Shí shēnzú lùn «識身足論» "Awareness-body foundation treatise" Abhidharma Vijñānakāyapāda śāstra by Devakṣema 提婆設摩. T 1539 (16 juan)

22. Rúlái shìjiào shèngjūnwáng jīng «如來示教勝軍王經» "Sutra where Tathāgata Reveals Teachings to King Prasenajit." Rājavavādaka sūtra. T 515 (1 juan).

23. Shen hsi yu ching «甚希有經» "Sutra on Most Rarified Existence." *Adbhūta-dharma-paryāya sūtra. T 689 (1 juan).

24. Apocryphal date of Xīn jing.

25. Púsà jiè jiémó wén «菩薩戒羯磨文» "Elaboration of On Conferring Bodhisattva Vinaya" Maitreya 彌勒. T 1499 (1 juan) [Yogācārabhūmi extract]

26. Wángfǎ zhènglǐ jīng «王法正理經» "Sutra of Correct Principles of Royal Rule" by Maitreya 彌勒. T 1615 (1 juan). [sū or śā?]

27. Zuì wúbǐ jīng «最無比經» "Supreme Incomparable Sutra". T 691 (1 juan)

28. Púsà jiè běn «菩薩戒本» "On Conferring Bodhisattva Vinaya" *Bodhisattvaśīla sūtra (Bodhisattva Pratimokṣa) by Maitreya 彌勒. T 1501 (1 juan).

29. Dàchéng zhǎngzhēn lùn «大乘掌珍論» "Mahāyāna Jewel in the Palm Treatise" Karatalaratna.T 1578 (2 juan).

30. Fo ti ching lun 佛地經論 "Treatise on the Buddha-Stage Sutra" Buddhabhūmi-sūtra śāstra by Bandhuprabha 親光, et al. T 1530 (7 juan).

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Year 650 (31)

31. Yīnmíng zhènglǐ mén lùn běn «因明正理門論本» "Gateway to Logic". Nyāyamukha by Dignāga 陳那. T 1628 (1 juan)

32. Chēngzàn jìngtǔ Fó shèshòu jīng «稱讚淨土佛攝受經» "Sutra In Praise of the Pure Land". (Smaller) Sukhāvatīvyūha Sūtra. T 367 (1 juan).

33. Yúqié shīdì lùn shì «瑜伽師地論釋» "Explanation of the Stages of Yoga Practice Treatise" Yogācārabhūmiśāstrakārikā. T 1580 (1 juan).

34. Fēnbié yuánqǐ chūshèng fǎmén jīng «分別緣起初勝法門經» "Sutra on The Primacy of the Dharma Gate Distinguishing Conditioned Arising". Vikalpapratītyasamutpāda Dharmottarapraveśa Sūtra. T 717. (2 juan)

35. Shuō wúgòuchēng jīng «說無垢稱經» "Sutra of the Teachings of Vimalakīrti" Vimalakīrtinirdeśa. T 476 (6 juan).

36. Yàoshī (liúlíguāng rúlái) běnyuàn gōngdé jīng «藥師（流璃光如來）本願功德經» The Meritorious Original Vow of the Medicine Master [Lapis Lazuli Radiance Tathāgata] Sutra." Bhaiṣajyaguruvaiḍūryaprabhāsapūrvapraṇidhānaviśeṣavistara. T 450 (1 juan).

37. Dàchéng guǎngbǎi lùn běn «大乘廣百論本» "Mahāyāna-Vaipulya One Hundred Treatise" *Catuḥśataka by Āryadeva 聖天. T 1570 (1 juan)

38. Dàchéng guǎngbǎi lùn shì lùn «大乘廣百論釋論» "Commentary on the Mahāyāna-Vaipulya One Hundred Treatise". By Dharmapāla 護法T 1571 (10 juan)

39. Běnshì jīng «本事經» "Original Events". Itivṛttaka sūtra. T 765 (7 juan).

40. Zhūfó xīn tuóluóní jīng «諸佛心陀羅尼經» "Sutra of the Dhāranī of the Heart of the Buddhas" Buddha-hṛdaya-dhāranī. T 918 (1 juan)

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Year 651 (83)

41. Shòuchí qī fó mínghào (suǒ shēng) gōngdé jīng «受持七佛名號（所生）功德經» "Receiving Merit [produced by] the Seven Amitābha Buddhas)." T 436 (1 juan)

42. Dàchéng dàjí dìzàng shílún jīng «大乘大集地藏十輪經» "Ten Cakras of Kṣitigarbha, Mahāyāna Great Collection Sutra." Daśacakrakṣitigarbha Sūtra. T 411 (10 juan).

43. Āpídámó zàng xiǎnzōng lùn «阿毘達磨藏顯宗論» "Revealing the Tenets of the Abhidharma Treasury." *Abhidharmasamayapradīpika or *Abhidharmakośaśāstrakārikāvibhāṣya by Saṅghabhadra 尊者眾賢. T 1563 (40 juan)

44. Āpídámó jùshè lùn «阿毘達磨俱舍論» "Treasury of Abhidharma" Abhidharmakośa-bhāṣya by Vasubandhu 世親. T 1558 (30 juan)

45. Āpídámó jùshè lùn běn sòng «阿毘達磨俱舍論本頌» "Treasury of Abhidharma." Abhidharmakośa by Vasubandhu 世親. T 1560 (1 juan).

46. Dàchéng chéngyè lùn «大乘成業論» "Mahāyāna Treatise Establishing Karma" Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa by Vasubandhu 世親. T 1609 (1 juan).

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Year 652 (8)

47. Dàchéng āpídámó jí lùn «大乘阿毘達磨集論» "Mahāyāna Abhidharma Compendium" Abhidharmasamuccaya by Asaṅga 無著. T 1605 (7 juan)

48. Fó lín nièpán jì fǎzhù jīng «佛臨涅槃記法住經» "Sutra of the Abiding Dharma Recorded Just Prior to Buddha's Nirvana." T 390 (1 juan)

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Year 653 (80)

49. Āpídámó shùnzhèng lǐ lùn «阿毘達磨順正理論» "Abhidharma According with Reason Treatise" Abhidharma-Nyāyānusāra śāstra by Saṅghabhadra (尊者)眾賢. T 1562 (80 juan).

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Year 654 (7)

50. Dà āluóhàn Nántí Mìduōluó suǒ shuō fǎzhù jì «大阿羅漢難提蜜多羅所說法住記» "Nandimitra's Record of the Abiding Dharma Explained to the Great Arhats." Nandimitrāvadāna [Excerpt from the Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra]. T 2030 (1 juan).

51. Chēngzàn Dàchéng gōngdé jīng «稱讚大乘功德經» "Sutra on the Merit of Extolling Mahāyāna." T 840 (1 juan).

52. Bájì kǔnàn tuóluóní jīng «拔濟苦難陀羅尼經» Sutra of the Dhāranī that Carries One Over Suffering and Adversity." T 1395 (1 juan).

53. Bā míng pǔmì tuóluóní jīng «八名普密陀羅尼經» "Sutra of the Dhāranī of the Universal and Esoteric Eight Names." T 1365 (1 juan).

54. Xiǎn wúbiān Fótǔ gōngdé jīng «顯無邊佛土功德經» "Sutra Revealing the Qualities of the Infinite Buddha-Lands." Tathāgatāṇaṃ Buddhakṣetra-guṇokta-dharma-paryāya. T 289 (1 juan).

55. Shèngchuáng bìyìn tuóluóní jīng «勝幢臂印陀羅尼經» "Sutra of the Dhāranī for Bearing the Banners and Seals." T 1363 (1 juan)

56. Chíshì tuóluóní jīng «持世陀羅尼經» "Sutra of the Dhāranī for Upholding the World." Vasudhāra-dhāranī. T 1162 (1 juan).

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Year 655 (0)

no translations

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Year 656 (201)

57. Shíyīmiàn shénzhòu xīn jīng «十一面神咒心經» "Sutra of the Divine Incantation of the Eleven-Headed" Avalokiteśvaraikādaśamukha-dhāranī. T 1071 (1 juan).

58. Āpídámó dà pípóshā lùn «阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論» "The Great Abhidharma Commentary" Mahāvibhāṣa. T 1545 (200 juan).

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Year 657 (21)

59. Āpídámó fāzhì lùn «阿毘達磨發智論» "Treatise on the Arising of Wisdom through the Abhidharma" Jñānaprasthāna śāstra. T 1544 (20 juan).

60. Guān suǒyuán yuán lùn «觀所緣緣論» "Treatise Contemplating Objective Conditions." Ālambana parikṣa by Dignāga 陳那. T 1624 (1 juan)

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Year 658 (2)

61. Rù āpídámó lùn «入阿毘達磨論» "Treatise on Entering Abhidharma." Abhidharmaāvatāraprakaraṇa by Skandhila 塞建陀羅. T 1554 (2 juan).

Year 659 (23)

62. Bùkōng juànsuǒ shénzhòu xīn jīng «不空罥索神咒心經» "Essential Scripture of Amogha's Ensnaring Divine Mantra." Amoghapāśahṛdaya śāstra. T 1094 (1 juan)

63. Āpídámó fǎyùn zú lùn «阿毘達磨法薀足論» "Treatise on Dharmas and Skandhas according to the Abhidharma Path." Abhidharma Dharmaskandhapāda Śāstra by Mahāmāudgalyāyana (尊者)大目乾連. T 1537 (12 juan).

64. Chéng Wéishí lùn «成唯識論» "Treatise Establishing Vijñaptimātra." *Vijñapti-mātra-siddhi śāstra by Xuanzang. T 1585 (10 juan).

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Year 660 (38)

65. Āpídámó pǐnlèi zú lùn «阿毘達磨品類足論» "Treatise of Classifications according to the Abhidharma Path" Abhidharmaprakaraṇapāda by Vasumitra (尊者)世友. T 1542 (18 juan).

66. Āpídámó jí yìmén zú lùn «阿毘達磨集異門足論» "Collection of Different Aspects of the Abhidharma Path Treatise" Abhidharmasaṅgītīparyāyapāda Śāstra. T 1536 (20 juan).

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Year 661 (4)

67. Biàn zhōngbiān lùn sòng «辯中邊論頌» "Verse Treatise on Distinguishing Between Middle and Extremes." Madhyāntavibhāga Kārikā by Maitreya 彌勒. T 1601 (1 juan)

68. Biàn zhōngbiān lùn «辯中邊論» "Treatise on Distinguishing Between Middle and Extremes" Madhyāntavibhāgabhāṣya by Vasubandhu 世親. T 1600 (1 juan).

69. Wéishí èrshí lùn «唯識二十論» "Twenty Verses on Vijñaptimātra Treatise." Viṃśatikāvṛtti by Vasubandhu 世親. T 1590 (1 juan).

70. Yuánqǐ jīng «緣起經» "Sutra on Conditioned Arising." Pratītyasamutpāda-divibhaṅganirdeśa Sūtra. T 124 (1 juan).

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Year 662 (1)

71. Yìbù zōnglún lùn «異部宗輪論» "Treatise of the Wheel of the Different Divisions of the Tenets" Samayabhedoparacanacakra by Vasumitra. T 2031 (1 juan) .

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Year 663 (606)

72. Āpídámó jièshēn zú lùn «阿毘達磨界身足論» "Treatise on Body Elements According to the Abhidharma Path" Abhidharma Dhātukāyapāda Śāstra by Vasumitra (尊者)世友. T 1540 (3 juan).

73. Wǔshì pípóshā lùn «五事毘婆沙論» "Five Phenomena Vibhāṣa Treatise" Pañcavastukavibhāṣa by Dharmatrāta (尊者)法救. T 1555 (2 juan).

74. Jìzhào shénbiàn sānmódì jīng «寂照神變三摩地經» "Sutra on the Samādhi of Singularly Radiant Spiritual Alterations" Praśāntaviniścayaprātihāryasamādhi Sūtra. T 648 (1 juan)

75. Dà bānrě bōluómì duō jīng «大般若波羅蜜多經» Mahāprajñāpāramitā Sūtra. T 220 (600 juan).

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Year 664 (1)

76. Zhòuwǔshǒu jīng «咒五首經» "Mantra of Five Heads Sutra." T 1034 (1 juan).

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Undated

77. Bāshí guījǔ sòng «八識規矩頌» "Verses on the Structure of the Eight Consciousnesses" by Xuanzang 玄奘. (? Juan)

~~o0o~~

Notes on Social Baseline Theory

Laughter is mediated strongly by social context: we are 30 times more likely to laugh if we are with someone else than if we are on our own (Scott et al. 2014: 1).

High quality social relationships correspond with longer, happier, and healthier lives—facts that hold true, as far as anyone knows, regardless of geography or culture (Coan and Sbarra 2015: 1)

I have long been an advocate for collectivism. My basic argument for collectivism is evolutionary rather than political: humans are an obligatorily social species; we evolved over millions of years to live in groups (small and large); and almost every feature of humanity only makes sense in this social perspective.

Moreover, one can see rudiments of the same social structures and processes in our great ape cousins, as well as in elephants, dolphins, and dogs. We also see them in some social birds. Nothing about the evolution of social species says that master-servant relationships are natural. Indeed, humans are the only mammals that enter into such relationships. If social species had a general motto, it would be:

"All for one and one for all.
United we stand, divided we fall."

I learned a great deal about this from Frans de Waal (1948 - 2024), the primate ethologist who regretted ever coining the widely misunderstood term "alpha male" (See this TED Talk video where he explains what it really means). More specifically, de Waal's book The Bonobo and the Atheist sketches out an evolutionary theory of morality as a feature of evolving to live socially (outlined in another TED Talk).

As the saying goes: "It takes a village to raise a child". This is not hyperbole. Apart from a handful of outliers, humans live in communities. Our genes generally get passed on within an extended community. The alternative, individualism, tends to be a pathology in a social species since individualism weakens the group and leaves individuals vulnerable to predators. Moreover, social isolation is known to cause both mental and physical health problems.

More recently, I have picked up on the idea of allostasis. I learned about this from Lisa Feldman Barrett's book How Emotions Are Made, but it also crops up in Karl Friston's free energy principle. I keep meaning to write something about the free energy principle, but haven't gotten to it yet. 

In this essay, I want to explore a newish idea that combines evolutionary perspectives on social lifestyles with allostasis. This new theory correlates extremely well with Frans de Waal's account of primate sociability and the evolution of morality. It also correlates well with Robin Dunbar's account of human evolution and the evolution of religion. These kinds of correlations with existing explanations (that I already find useful) are what I look for in a new idea. The best explanations are those that cover the broadest range of topics with the smallest number of assumptions.

I begin with some background on allostasis and the free energy principle, before outlining social baseline theory as it appears in the literature.

Homeostasis and Allostasis

We have long known that certain bodily processes are governed by feedback mechanisms that keep our bodies within specific limits, a goal known as homeostasis. The study of feedback in this sense is called cybernetics.

An obvious example of homeostasis in humans is body temperature, which ideally stays in a 1 °C range: 36.5–37.5 °C. That is, we ideally keep our body temperature to within half a degree of 37 °C. Prolonged periods of too low or high temperatures may be fatal. If we go below 36.5 °C, we get goosebumps and shiver, which warms us; if we go above 37.5 °C, we start to sweat, pant, and/or fan ourselves, which cools us. In this way, we can survive in air temperatures of roughly -50 °C to +50 °C. 

However, it soon became apparent that something more active was also going on, especially in the brain. Rather than relying entirely on reactive homeostasis, the brain is actually predicting what will happen next and preparing for that. Predictions are based on expectations formed from past experience. This process, which has the same goal as homeostasis, is called allostasis.

Allostasis is often likened to Bayesian inference, and for some, it is functionally similar to the idea of the Bayesian brain (although see also Mangalam (2025) for a critique). In Bayesian inference, we try to find the most likely outcome by iteratively improving our knowledge and using that knowledge to assess the likelihood of various possible outcomes. This is also similar to the scientific method more generally. We can take it to refer to a process of updating our expectations based on the available knowledge.

Karl Friston's free energy principle suggests that biological systems, right down to the level of individual cells, have Bayesian-like processes that minimise unexpected results, by either refining predictions or changing something (internal or external to the cell). There is a kind of intelligence here that is evident even in single-celled organisms. And Friston proposes that this process is driven by physical processes analogous to thermodynamics.

I should add that this "intelligence" is in no way connected to being aware or self-aware. The fact that we can see it in single-celled organisms means that it's a purely mechanistic process, albeit one of dazzling complexity (even at that scale). That said, it's difficult to watch, say, an amoeba pursuing its prey without imagining some kind of agency. However, this reflects a limit on the human imagination, not a statement about nature generally. Humans have a strong tendency to see agency where none exists, as explained by Justin L. Barrett in Why Would Anyone Believe in God? (which I have cited many times over the years).

We've probably all experienced "getting up top fast", where, rising from sitting to standing, we briefly get light-headed and dizzy. This is a minor failure in allostasis. What usually happens is that the desire to stand up occurs and the body automatically begins to prepare for it by, for example, raising your blood pressure. Better to be prepared and then not need it than to pass out from lack of blood in the brain every time you stand up in a hurry.

We need to be clear that the brain is not acting like a little person in this scenario. The brain, per se, does not know what's going on. The brain, per se, is not aware separately from our first-person perspective. At the end of the day, all the brain does is accept inputs and generate outputs. In human self-awareness, the functioning of the brain is entirely transparent to our first-person perspective. The brain was not even suspected to be where thinking goes on until the late 19th century. 

To date, we can only describe the functioning of the brain as a kind of "black box". The brain receives millions of inputs from nerves and its own neurons, it weighs and evaluates those inputs, and it then produces a variety of outputs, including actions such as changing the balance of substances in our blood, changing our respiration, and moving our body around. A movement like walking involves thousands of signals per second, going to hundreds of muscles, which must contract and relax in a very specific sequence, or we simply fall over. Balancing on two legs is an incredibly complex process, which is only made more difficult by moving around. However, such processes are also entirely transparent to our conscious mind, because conscious coordination on that scale would be far too slow to be useful, if it were possible at all.

As well as coordinating nerve inputs and outputs, the brain also coordinates energy inputs and outputs in the body. The brain tries to anticipate energy expenditure and tries to ensure that the body has sufficient resources. And this part is generally not under our conscious control. It involves feelings like hunger and satiation. It makes sense that the brain would seek to minimise or at least optimise energy expenditure when seeking any goal.

For example, we walk most places rather than sprinting at full speed. Sprinting requires very intensive use of resources that cannot be sustained over more than about 15 seconds, usually with a recovery time of several hours, which limits how often one can sprint. Fanny Blankers-Koen (Netherlands) won four sprint races in one day at the 1948 London Olympics, running a total of 580 m. Although note, she also went on a celebratory shopping spree before the final relay, arriving back at the stadium with only 10 minutes to spare. Blanker-Koen might have run in other races that day, but the organisers limited her to three individual races and one relay. Still there are limits. 

By contrast, humans can easily walk for several hours every day, day after day. Energy budgeting turns out to be a very powerful way of thinking about what the brain does. Slow and steady does win the race over long distances.

One of the striking features of Karl Friston's free energy principle is that cells, brains, and organisms use the same basic architecture to optimise energy expenditure. Hence, the incredible explanatory power of the free energy principle.

Friston says that optimising energy expenditure is based on making accurate predictions, or in other words, based on minimising surprises. Discrepancies between expectation and reality (aka surprises) are dealt with in one of two ways: change the prediction or change the input (i.e do an action). The less we have to change predictions or take unexpected actions, the better we can manage our energy expenditure.

I am still a bit vague about the next part of the argument. As I understand it, at present, Friston's most important contribution has been to mathematically describe this process of minimising surprise. This enabled him to show that minimising surprise is mathematically the same idea as minimising free energy in information theory. Moreover, both are mathematically equivalent to Bayesian inference.

If you watch interviews with Friston, he tends to switch between three approaches: his own mathematical description of surprise, information theory, and Bayesian theory. In order to follow his train of thought, one needs to know these topics quite well. And, honestly, I don't.

Another important concept is allostatic load, a term coined by Bruce McEwen and Eliot Stellar (1993). I have written about this before without knowing what it was called (see Rumination, the Stress Response, and Meditation. 22 January 2016). McEwen and Stellar (1993: 2093) define allostatic load as:

...the cost of chronic exposure to fluctuating or heightened neural or neuroendocrine response resulting from repeated or chronic environmental challenge that an individual reacts to as being particularly stressful.

Allostatic load has measurable consequences, such as changes in blood pressure and cortisol levels. It is a physiological process whereby an organism can become depleted by constant stress. I first observed this in a biology class in 1982 while studying earthworms. I especially noted that fight or flight responses rapidly drain our resources (especially in the endocrine system), which take some time to recover. For example, physiological arousal causes our adrenal glands to secrete adrenaline (aka epinephrine). The adrenaline is released in milliseconds, but it takes several hours to replenish. While we try to keep some in reserve, chronic arousal depletes the store. If our store of adrenaline is exhausted, the body tries to become aroused, i.e. ready to fight or flee, but it cannot respond. 

Repeated stimulation of these responses without time to recover leads to responses of diminishing intensity until we become unable to respond. In my earlier essay, I made a connection from this to what doctors in the UK call major depression (aka clinical depression). And I characterised depression as a collapse of our ability to respond to stimuli as the result of hyper-stimulation or what I would now call allostatic overload. Many have noted that the symptoms of depression are as much physical as mental.  Physical exhaustion is a common symptom of depression, consistent with adrenaline depletion. A recent review of many studies (Gou et al 2025) confirms my suspicion:

High [allostatic load] is positively associated with increased risks of depression, anxiety, and suicide, highlighting its potential as a predictive tool in mental health.

With this preamble complete, we can now explore an idea that applies this same kind of insight on a higher level of organisation: the social group.

Social Baseline Theory

Social Baseline Theory was first proposed by Lane Beckes and James A. Coan in 2011. With subsequent contributions from David A. Sbarra and others. I should emphasise that social baseline theory is still relatively new. While it emerges from considering patterns in neuroscience evidence, it is still somewhat speculative. I'm enthusiastic because what has emerged to date is very consistent with ideas that I've been writing about for a decade or more. To me, it makes good sense, and I find it a useful addition to how I think about humanity.

The basic insight of social baseline theory is that, having evolved to live in groups, one of the things we expect in our optimisation of energy expenditure is social input. In this view, having good social connections is part of the baseline of being social. Our social group is perceived by the body as a resource that it can draw on. A corollary of this is that not having those connections is actually a drain on us.

As noted, Friston sees the same kind of allostatic mechanism operating in both cells, brains, and organisms. Here, Beckes and Coan extend this same reasoning to social groups. The abstract from the original paper is an excellent (if jargon-heavy) summary:

Social proximity and interaction attenuate cardiovascular arousal, facilitate the development of non-anxious temperament, inhibit the release of stress hormones, reduce threat-related neural activation, and generally promote health and longevity. Conversely, social subordination, rejection and isolation are powerful sources of stress and compromised health. Drawing on the biological principle of economy of action, perception / action links, and the brain’s propensity to act as a Bayesian predictor, Social Baseline Theory (SBT) proposes that the primary ecology to which human beings are adapted is one that is rich with other humans. Moreover, SBT suggests that the presence of other people helps individuals to conserve important and often metabolically costly somatic and neural resources through the social regulation of emotion. (Beckes & Coan 2011)

This might be too technical for some, so let's unpack it by working through their argument. In this view, then, humans require the presence of other humans to help regulate our bodies.

...the human brain is designed to assume that it is embedded within a relatively predictable social network characterized by familiarity, joint attention, shared goals, and interdependence. (Beckes and Coan 2011: 976-977)

The brain was not "designed". I would say that the brain evolved to expect being socially embedded. Other than this quibble, this part of the explanation seems reasonably clear. The fact that we evolved to live in communities means that the presence of a community is something that we expect to be present. It would be weird not to. It also makes the absence of a community notable. In short, evolution has optimised our bodies and minds for living in close-knit communities. And as Frans de Waal noted, social animals have two capacities in common: empathy and reciprocity. We respond emotionally to our community and they to us. 

The presence or absence of a supportive social environment is evident in our blood, especially during stressful events. Individuals carry the whole load of the stress, communities distribute it. 

What Beckes and Coan are saying is that allostasis which we can see operating in cells and brains, can also be seen to operate at the level of communities. 

Moreover, Beckes, Coan and others have observed that when social support is available, the parts of the brain believed to be involved in self-regulating emotions are less active. Which suggests that the regulation of emotions in social situations works by a different mechanism. This leads to socialised awareness:

When proximity [to a supportive community] is maintained or reestablished, the brain is simply less vigilant for potential threats, because it is embedded within the social environment to which it is adapted. (Beckes and Coan 2011: 977)

There are specific biological mechanisms that make being in a social group more energy efficient for all the individuals involved. 

Both social baseline theory and the free energy principle assume that one of the main roles of the brain is optimising the body's energy use. And many studies in both humans and animals support this conclusion (Beckes and Coan 2011: 978).

There are two principal benefits to this: risk distribution and load sharing.

Even though group living can be costly in terms of resource competition, overall fitness is enhanced in groups by decreasing the risk of predation, injury, and other potential threats (Krebs & Davies, 1993)... Thus, social groups typically settle into sizes that optimize access to food against the distribution of risk across group members. (Beckes and Coan 2011: 978)

Risk distribution is more or less just safety in numbers. If the task is spotting predators, for example, then having a dozen pairs of eyes is more efficient than just one. This means that when someone "has your back", you are able to use energy more efficiently.

Loading sharing is a distribution of effort towards common goals (Coan & Sbarra 2015: 2). This takes on more significance in the light of allostatic load. Sharing the allostatic load decreases the cost of responding to stress, by distributing it across the group.

Load sharing means that the activities of other group members provide benefits to the individual, whether the individual participates or not. For example, in foraging societies, we often see men focused on hunting and women focused on gathering (and sometimes cultivating) plants. Women benefit from having meat, and men benefit from having vegetables. And both benefit from the specialisation that leads to enhanced expertise. 

We feel less threatened by surprising stimuli when we are in the presence of someone with whom we share a bond. In this view, our social network becomes an extension of our self. Normally, the presence of other people helps us to regulate our emotions in ways that are more efficient than simple self-regulation.

Many theorists have suggested that the self is “expanded” by relationships with others [26]. This may be literally true at the neural level. For example, the brain encodes threats directed at familiar others very similarly to how it encodes threats directed at the self—but no such similarity obtains for strangers [27]. (Coan & Sbarra 2015: 3)

This appears to be consistent with the idea that identity in some societies is more social than amongst industrialised Europeans and colonists. Indeed, the rampant individualism associated with the Neoliberal Revolution can be seen as a pathological state for a social species. We cannot survive alone, much less attain our broader aims in life.

An extension of social baseline theory involving the concept of allostatic load was proposed by Saxbe et al (2020). They proposed that allostatic load has a social analogue. This makes sense. In a social group characterised by the capacities for empathy and reciprocity, we might imagine that emotional contagion generalises.

Robin Dunbar (2014, 2023) has observed that group bonding in non-human primates is strongly based on one-to-one activities, especially grooming. Grooming stimulates endorphins, which mediate our sense of well-being. Grooming calms both the individuals involved and creates a sense of bonding (or attachment).

However, Dunbar points out that human groups have grown too large for one-to-one grooming to be efficient. We simply don't have time for ~150 individuals to spend enough time grooming each other for this to work. What we have instead are group activities that achieve the same end. Notably, collective practices such as singing and dancing together have the same effect on our sense of well-being as grooming does in other animals.

The idea of social allostatic load is that our relationships help us to regulate our emotions. And the loss of relationships then puts additional stress on the individual.

Conclusion

None of this seems surprising or counterintuitive. It is entirely consistent with the idea that we evolved, over millions of years, to live in social groups. It is also consistent with the idea that we employ both homeostatic and allostatic processes at a variety of scales.

...the brain manages energy and behavior by making predictions about outcomes given (i) the current situation (particularly constraints, risks, and opportunities), (ii) the predicted possible future situation(s), (iii) situational goals, (iv) current energy states, and (v) expected future energy states (Beckes and Coan 2011: 980-981).

Or as Coan and Sbarra (2015: 1) put it:

... the human brain assumes proximity to social resources—resources that comprise the intrinsically social environment to which it is adapted. Put another way, the human brain expects access to relationships characterized by interdependence, shared goals, and joint attention.

My comment here is that the human brain is like this because we evolved to live in communities.

Beckes and Coan also make the link from Social Baseline Theory to another popular model: Attachment Theory. This is a topic for another essay, I just wanted to note the connection. 

Some readers may recall that I often cite Ariel Glucklich (1997) when talking about magic. In his book The End of Magic, he says

Magic is based on a unique type of consciousness: the awareness of the interrelatedness of all things in the world by means of simple but refined sense perception... magical actions... constitute a direct, ritual way of restoring the experience of relatedness in cases where that experience has been broken by disease, drought, war, or any number of other events. (1997: 12)

However, in refreshing my memory of that first citation in 2008, I noticed something that I usually forget. The next part of the story is:

[Magic] is a natural phenomenon, the product of our evolution as a human species and an acquired ability for adapting to various ecological and social environments. (1997: 12)

As I say, I find an idea more compelling when it fits with other explanations I find useful. One idea that explains numerous phenomena is more compelling than an idea that explains one phenomenon in isolation. We could now say that "magic" exploits the effects described by social baseline theory. A sense of being securely connected to our social environment is essential to health and well-being.

And thus the general sense of alienation and isolation that pervades British and (more so) US culture is a symptom of a deep malaise. The Neoliberals sought to downplay "society" in order to foster extreme forms of individualism (including libertarians and billionaires), which have been all too clearly detrimental to both Britain and the USA.

Stressed by constant change, constant threats to our livelihood, and threats to our communities, we begin to experience allostatic overload. Depression and anxiety are some of the most obvious results. Given the pace of change in my lifetime and the disruptions caused by the Neoliberal revolution, we might expect to see sharp increases in mental health problems after the 1980s. And we do. 

And this leads me to one last connection. In an article that dramatically changed how I see modern politics, Karen Stenner (2020) describes how and why some people opt to support authoritarian leaders. In Stenner's terms, people with the authoritarian disposition make up around 30% of the population. They are characterised by low scores on IQ tests and low scores on the Big 5 criterion of openness to experience. Such people want sameness (group conformity) and oneness (group authority). When that expectation is denied and combined with, say, perceived economic hardship (such as a decline in living standards), then they support the first authoritarian ruler who comes along promising a return to the "good old days". Thus, we can see the rise of fascism in the 21st century as a response to social allostatic overload caused by the neoliberal revolution. 

As I say, social baseline theory is relatively new still. More research needs to be done to establish it in the scientific community. That said, the idea that we rely on other people is a no-brainer. We do. Of course we do. What we are doing here is not stating some new and hitherto unsuspected truth. Rather, we are finessing and "putting the eyebrows on" something that everyone knows. 

Social baseline theory emphasises that, for an obligatorily social animal, the lack of a social context prevents us from optimising our energy expenditure and is detrimental to our health and well-being.

~~Φ~~

Bibliography

Barrett, Justin L. (2004). Why Would Anyone Believe in God? Altamira Press.

Beckes, L., & Coan, J. A. (2011). "Social baseline theory: The role of social proximity in emotion and economy of action." Social and Personality Psychology Compass, 5(12), 976–988. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1751-9004.2011.00400.x

Coan, J. A., & Sbarra, D. A. (2015). "Social Baseline Theory: The Social Regulation of Risk and Effort." Current Opinion in Psychology 1: 87–91. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.copsyc.2014.12.021 https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC4375548/

Dunbar, Robin. (2014). Human Evolution: A Pelican Introduction. Pelican.

Dunbar, Robin. (2023). How Religion Evolved: And Why It Endures. Penguin.

Glucklich, Ariel. (1997). The end of magic. New York, Oxford University Press.

Gou, Y., Chenga, S., Kanga, M. et al. (2025). "Association of Allostatic Load With Depression, Anxiety, and Suicide: A Prospective Cohort Study." Archival Report 97(8): 786-793. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.biopsych.2024.09.026

Mangalam, M. (2025). "The myth of the Bayesian brain." European Journal of Applied Physiology, 125(10), 2643–2677. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00421-025-05855-6

McEwen, B.S. & Stellar, E. (1993). "Stress and the individual. Mechanisms leading to disease". Archives of Internal Medicine 153(18): 2093–2101. doi:10.1001/archinte.153.18.2093.

Saxbe, D. E., Beckes, L., Stoycos, S. A., & Coan, J. A. (2020). "Social Allostasis and Social Allostatic Load: A New Model for Research in Social Dynamics, Stress, and Health." Perspectives on psychological science: a journal of the Association for Psychological Science 15(2): 469–482. https://doi.org/10.1177/1745691619876528

Scott, S. K., Lavan, N., Chen, S., & McGettigan, C. (2014). "The social life of laughter." Trends in Cognitive Sciences 18(12): 618–620. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2014.09.002

Stenner, Karen. 2020. "Authoritarianism." Hope Not Hate. https://hopenothate.org.uk/2020/11/01/authoritarianism/

Philosophical Detritus VII: Arguments About Gods.

Over the years I've met many a fundamentalist Christian online looking to troll atheists. I am technically an atheist, since I don't believe in gods, though I don't usually identify as one. I identify as a pragmatic naturalist. I see naturalism as an epistemic philosophical stance which argues that the natural world is all that we can know, since the only channel for gathering information we have is sensory experience. I have concluded, after decades of consideration and hanging out with mystics, that there are no supernatural realms, forces, or beings. And I broadly accept accounts from evolutionary psychology about what makes the supernatural seem plausible (see especially Barrett 2004).

I assert that gods, along with unicorns and time travel, are part of the human imaginarium rather than a part of nature. We cannot study gods as we might study a natural phenomenon, because there are no natural phenomena unequivocally associated with gods. The closest we ever get to gods is the anthropological study of how belief in gods affects the behaviour of believers. 

However, belief in powerful supernatural beings is more or less ubiquitous across human cultures. Despite the protestations of Buddhist modernists, this includes all Buddhist cultures. While Buddhists do not worship a creator, most Buddhists do worship Buddha or some other figure as a powerful supernatural being. Intercessory prayer to Guanyin is a major feature of the history of the Heart Sutra, which I spent 12 years researching in forensic detail. And gods of various kinds feature on almost every page of the Pāli suttas: from major Vedic gods like Brahmā and Indra (Sakka), to autochthonous gods like yakkha and kinnara.

When asked about his first act in reforming the Chinese state if he were made Emperor, Confucius opted for clarification of terminology. I like this. As a naturalist, I don't capitalise the word "god" because I don't accept the privileging of this idea or any one version of it. Since gods all seem to have conventional names, I prefer to use these. Thus, I write about "Jehovah" rather than "God". By refusing to frame this essay in terms of "God", I consciously reject the Christian framing of the discussion. This is also consistent with not identifying as an atheist. Despite writing about some Christian ideas that are part of my cultural heritage, I'm not a Christian, and I don't accept the validity of any Christian interpretation of mythology or doctrine.

This essay is about some of the ways that Christians, or more precisely Christian theologians have defended their ideas about Jehovah. Not that an omnipotent, omnipresent, and omniscient being, with a notable penchant for smiting his enemies, needs defending from puny humans. Nonetheless, many such apologetics have been offered over the last 2000 years. Clearly, Christians felt the need to defend Jehovah long before science began to erode the foundations of all religions.

Jehovah or Yahweh is the creator god of Christians and Jews, sometimes also known as El "god" or El Shaddai "god of the mountains, god almighty". In the Semitic languages, al or el is used the way we use "god" in English; it's a generic title. In Hebrew scripture, Yahweh's name is printed as a sequence of consonants: YHWH. Yahweh is a scholarly reconstruction of the vowels. The actual pronunciation was deliberately suppressed. It was replaced with euphemisms like Adonai "Lord" when scriptures were read aloud, and the real pronunciation was eventually lost. In Hebrew, Yahweh is also referred to as Elohim (a plural used to suggest greatness), El Elyon “God Most High”, El Roi “God Who Sees”, El Olam “Everlasting God”.

By contrast, the name Jehovah was invented by Christians. It is a mongrel that combines the consonants of YHWH with the vowels of Adonai. A quirk of linguistic history resulted in the first (short) a becoming e. The name Jehovah is consciously avoided in the New Testament, where it is typically replaced by Greek Kyrios "Lord" or Theos "God". Thus, it is convenient to distinguish Yahweh, the Judaic god, from Jehovah, the Christian god.

Of course, Jehovah is not the only creator god in world mythology. There is also Allah, which is not a name but a title. Allah also means "god" and is linguistically related to the Hebrew El. Culturally, Arabs and Jews trace their ancestry to the mythical figure of Abraham; hence, we refer to "the Abrahamic religions", but the similarities end there. Yahweh and Allah are two different gods, from related cultures with related languages, whose followers both call them "God". Other creator gods include: Ahura Mazda, Brahmā, Marduk, and many more. Not all cultures have a creator god, but there are many that do. And as we will see, this simple fact is consequential for theological arguments.

Moreover, there are something like 10,000 different sects of Christianity, and many of the schisms were the result of arguing about Jehovah or the nature of Jehovah. So we need to be a bit wary of seeing Christianity as monolithic. 

Argumentation in the Absence of Evidence

The fact is that Jehovah is not a natural phenomenon even in theory. Christian beliefs place him before, outside, and above nature (the super in supernatural means "above"). Christians have never really defended Jehovah based on direct empirical evidence. There are a number of standard theological defences of Jehovah. In what follows, I look at a dozen different approaches, giving a brief overview followed by some comments on where each approach fails (which they all do). 

Cosmological arguments infer Jehovah from motion, causation, or contingency as a first cause or necessary being. These arguments originate in Greek philosophy (Aristotle, ca. 4th BCE) and are adapted to Jehovah by Philo (ca. 20 BCE – ca.  50 CE) and medieval figures such as Thomas Aquinas (1225–1274).

First cause arguments are powerful, but they don't point to Jehovah in particular. Rather, by adopting oversimplified, linear models of causation, they arrive at a dilemma: either there is a first cause, or the universe is infinitely old. And since they believe, a priori, that the world was created at a point in time (by Jehovah), and is thus not eternal, they assume that Jehovah was the first cause. But there is nothing in this argument that says that the first cause was Jehovah rather than, say, Allah, Ahura Mazda, or even some non-supernatural force. That said, causation is neither simple nor linear: everything is interacting with everything else, all at once. So this argument fails establish the existence of Jehovah.

Incidentally, Brahmins already anticipated this kind of infinite regress argument in the Bṛhadāranyka Upaniṣad, probably composed around the 8th century BCE, where Yajñavalkya cuts it off by saying "Don't ask too many questions, Gārgī, or your head will shatter apart" (BU 3.6). In my view, we have to risk head-shattering and keep asking questions.

Teleological arguments infer Jehovah as an intelligent designer from order or purposiveness in nature. Early versions of such arguments already appear in Plato (d. ca. 348/347 BCE) and the Stoics (4th–3rd ca. BCE). They became standard in medieval and early modern "natural theology". Intelligent design arguments have become popular amongst educated Christians in the 21st century.

These kinds of arguments proceed from the twin assumptions that the world was created and that a creation requires a designer. Nothing about the universe, per se, suggests that it was created. Creationism is a belief. And as my readers know, belief is a feeling about an idea.

Notably, the fact of evolution shows that no designer is needed. Organisms evolve over time through random mutation and natural selection: no design is involved, and thus no designer is required. Moreover, having a designer would have resulted in more efficient and effective designs, whereas our bodies are all too obviously kludged together over millennia.

Historical arguments proceed from alleged "historical" acts such as miracles, covenants, or fulfilled prophecy. They arise in early Jewish and Christian apologetics (1st – 3rd c. CE), associated with figures like Josephus and Justin Martyr. Such arguments presuppose that scripture is historical rather than mythological. This is not a tenable stance to take. Religious storytelling may well incorporate historical elements, real geography, and so on, but this doesn't make it a witness to history.

This style of argumentation is also common amongst Buddhists and philologically-oriented Buddhist Studies scholars who wish to assert the historicity of the Buddha despite the lack of anything a historian would call "evidence" (See Attwood 2023). As David Drewes (2023: 404) pointed out recently:

Everything that makes the Buddha a Buddha is supernatural: his discovery of the Dharma by his own power; his understanding of karma, the geography of the world, the structure of the cosmos, the path to liberation, and the makeup of living beings and the material world; his freedom from desire; his omniscience; his thirty-two marks; his special characteristics and powers.

Scripture is always mythological. It is seldom, if ever, a reliable historical source, except as reflecting the view of the people who wrote the scripture down.

Apophatic arguments propose that Jehovah must exist while exceeding all finite description, making him accessible only through negation. They originate in late antique Neoplatonism (3rd – 6th century CE) and enter Jewish and Christian theology via figures like Pseudo-Dionysius (fl. 500 CE).

This is not really an argument for Jehovah, per se, since it explicitly assumes his existence. Apophatic arguments are only a workaround for his being supernatural and thus indescribable. Again, this approach doesn't single out Jehovah from the plethora of creator gods, for whom all the same claims to supernatural puissance are made.

Ontological arguments claim that conceiving Jehovah as a maximally great or necessary being entails that he must exist, because existence is a perfection that such a being cannot lack. This style of argumentation originated with Anselm in the 11th century and was later reformulated by Descartes (1596–1650) and Leibniz (1646–1716).

This is all too obviously circular. It relies on the a priori belief that Jehovah is a being, rather than, say, a fictional character. And it assumes the characteristics that Christians attribute to Jehovah are real characteristics.

Ontological arguments have the same problem as the cosmological argument. Nothing about the "greatest being" points to Jehovah unless we assume that Jehovah is the greatest being. The argument cannot distinguish Jehovah from other "supreme beings".

Moral arguments claim that objective moral facts or duties require Jehovah as their ground or lawgiver. While antecedents exist, the recognisably philosophical form emerges in the 17th –18th centuries with Hugo Grotius (1583 – 1645) and Immanuel Kant (1724 – 1804).

The idea that morality has to be imposed from an external source is an assumption. And this idea finds political expression in Thomas Hobbes, one of the most influential English philosophers. Hobbes was born as the Spanish Armada sailed to England, and lived through the 30 Years' War and the English Civil War, leaving him with a very jaded view of humans. He came to believe that being at war is our natural state and that humans require a tyrant to force them to stop being violent. This is ironic because the wars Hobbes lived through were very much the result of the ruling classes fighting over who got to be the tyrant.

In fact, as Frans de Waal (2013) and his colleagues have shown, morality emerges from evolving to be a social species. We can unpack morality from just two capacities that are shared by all social mammals and many social birds: empathy and reciprocity. (see also The Evolution of Morality, 18 November 2016). We don't need gods or tyrants.

Moreover, once again, even if we were to stipulate that morality was an externality, this would not point to Jehovah in particular, only to a supernatural "law giver". Which could just as easily be Ahura Mazda or Marduk.

Arguments from religious experience treat experiences interpreted as encounters with Jehovah as prima facie evidence. They are articulated explicitly in early modern philosophy (17th – 18th c.), notably by John Locke (1632 – 1704) and Friedrich Schleiermacher (1768 – 1834).

This is a style of argument for the supernatural that I have frequently encountered amongst Buddhists. We know that religious practices often lead to hallucinations. I have particularly drawn attention to the common phenomenology of sensory deprivation and meditation (See Attwood 2022). Beyond this, common religious practices—such as fasting and sleep deprivation—heighten susceptibility to hallucinations.

When religieux experience hallucinations, or even just altered states, they interpret these through the lens of their religion. So, again, the arguments for Jehovah from experience are circular because they take Jehovah to be axiomatic.

I already noted in my exposition on time that experiencing timelessness, or being in a seemingly timeless state, is not the same as actually being outside of time. Experience does not easily translate into metaphysics.

Thomas Metzinger's treatment of out-of-body experiences is a paradigmatic example of refuting arguments from experience. He not only shows that his mind never did leave his body, but his alternative rational explanation is so powerful that he can now reliably induce out-of-body experiences in naive subjects under laboratory conditions.

Argument from revelation: Appeal to the authority, coherence, or fulfilment claims of texts taken to be revelations of Jehovah. They developed in late antiquity (1st – 4th c. CE) alongside canon formation and apologetics.

This is a wholly circular argument based on belief in Jehovah. Many Buddhists fundamentalists make the same kind of argument about the Buddha and Buddhist scripture. Scripture is only considered authoritative by believers. This is not an argument that can carry any weight outside of fundamentalist cults and sections of religiously inspired academic Buddhist Studies (see Attwood 2023).

Pragmatic arguments seek to justify belief in Jehovah by its practical or existential benefits rather than demonstrative proof. These arguments originate with Pascal (1623 – 1662) in the 17th century and gain prominence in modern sceptical contexts.

This is largely a reference to Pascal's wager. Pascal's argument was that one cannot know for sure if Jehovah exists or not. But if he exists and if Christian descriptions of his behaviour are accurate, then one can make a calculation of risks and rewards involved. And Pascal concluded that the inconvenience of being a Christian is massively outweighed by the risk of eternal damnation and the promise of infinite rewards.

Note how much work "if" is doing in these sentences. Pascal's wager makes sense if the only choices are Christianity and atheism. The calculus breaks down when we acknowledge that other supreme beings are claimed to exist. And after all, other religions with other gods are no more or less plausible than Christianity is. What if we bet on Jehovah, but "God" is actually Marduk or Zeus? There is no clear wager here.

Arguments from reason or intelligibility claim that logic, rationality, or the intelligibility of the world presupposes Jehovah as a rational source. They are largely modern (19th–20th c.), reacting to naturalism and materialism.

Again, this is simply a circular argument that treats Jehovah as axiomatic. Moreover, it also suffers from being Jehovah-centric. The criterion of intelligibility does not distinguish between supreme beings. What if Ahura Mazda is the supernatural being required to make the world intelligible? In that case, Jehovah contributes nothing.

Argument from consciousness: Hold that subjective experience or intentionality cannot be adequately explained without reference to Jehovah. This line of argument is mainly late modern (19th–20th c.), tied to debates over physicalism.

I have expounded at length on how consciousness is a useless legacy concept that no one can define. It cannot be used as the basis of an argument without a consensus on what it means. And no such consensus exists. Worse, consciousness is an abstract concept. An ontological argument based on abstractions is an oxymoron.

Again, the failure of science to adequately explain being conscious of experience does not point to Jehovah per se. If some supernatural input is required, then why not invoke Baal or Marduk? There's nothing special about Jehovah.

Argument from beauty or value seeks to infer Jehovah from irreducible aesthetic or axiological features of reality. It becomes explicit in the 18th–19th centuries, especially in Romantic and post-Kantian thought.

Here, Jehovah is presupposed to be a viable explanation of beauty or value. This, in turn, presupposes that Christian descriptions of Jehovah are accurate. Proponents also presuppose that Jehovah has no competition from other religions. They also presuppose that aesthetics, like morality, must be imposed on us from the outside rather than emerging from within us.

This is both a classic god-of-the-gaps argument and something more. There is a gap in our explanations of axiological matters into which Christians shoehorn Jehovah. But the failure of science, history, and philosophy to explain beauty in a satisfactory way is not an argument for Jehovah. It's just a gap in our understanding of the world.

In fact, simply invoking Jehovah doesn't explain anything. If you presuppose that Christians accurately describe Jehovah, then this, effortlessly, explains everything. And the rest is just details we needn't bother with. No one ever says how Jehovah explains beauty. No mechanisms are presented. And thus, in the end, nothing is explained by invoking Jehovah.

Conclusion

In my experience, science is not the preferred tool for critiquing religion (and most religieux don't understand scientific arguments anyway). Rather, my preferred tool is historical perspective.

For example, the majority of arguments for Jehovah are vitiated simply by acknowledging that other supreme beings are proposed by other religions, and on exactly the same basis. All of these arguments about Jehovah seem to presuppose that Jehovah is the only choice of god that we have. If we step outside Christian parochialism and acknowledge that other religions exist, then arguments for Jehovah are trivially invalidated in almost every case. None of the traditional Christian arguments that they claim point to Jehovah's existence is capable of singling out Jehovah from the plethora of available gods.

When the existence of Jehovah is axiomatic in your thinking, then your reasoning will always arrive at the conclusion that Jehovah exists. Because axioms are what we take to be true a priori and they become the criteria by which we validate conclusions. When we presuppose Jehovah, then any conclusion which seems to affirm the existence of Jehovah is judged to be true. And this circular, and thus invalid, logic is present in all of the traditional arguments for Jehovah.

Finally, when Jehovah is treated as an ultimate explanation of life, the universe, and everything, then invoking Jehovah becomes a way of shutting down awkward discussions or obfuscating ignorance. Simply saying "God" explains everything does not actually explain anything. An explanation generally involves pointing to causal sequences of events. Which Christians have never been able to do.

Such arguments begin very early on in the history Christianity . And they have been persistently employed and updated down to the present. Christians appear to know that there is an ongoing question and keep trying to come up with ways to shut down the discussion. Nevertheless, the discussion is ongoing.

~~Φ~~

Bibliography

Attwood, Jayarava (2022). "Sensory Deprivation and the Threefold Way." Unpublished essay. https://www.academia.edu/83896358/Sensory_Deprivation_and_the_Threefold_Way

Attwood, Jayarava (2023). "On Historical Methods in Buddhist Studies and the Disputed Historicity of the Buddha." Unpublished essay. https://www.academia.edu/121900443/On_Historical_Methods_in_Buddhist_Studies_and_the_Disputed_Historicity_of_the_Buddha

Barrett, Justin L. (2004). Why Would Anyone Believe in God? Altamira Press.

Waal, Frans de. (2013). The bonobo and the Atheist: In Search of Humanism Amongst the Primates. W.W. Norton & Co.